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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.   
 The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. § 111(b)—
assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees 
of the United States—is categorically a crime of violence under 
§ 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We hold 
that it is.  
I 
 Following an altercation with a correctional officer at 
the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg in 2016, Julious 
Bullock pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally forcibly 
assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating, and 
interfering with a correctional officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 111(a) and (b). At sentencing, the District Court adopted the 
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Presentence Investigation Report’s (PSR) Guidelines 
calculation in its entirety. Based on the Court’s determination 
that Bullock qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1, his Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months’ 
imprisonment. The Court gave Bullock a substantial 
downward variance, imposing a sentence of 84 months’ 
imprisonment.  
 Bullock timely appealed, challenging the District 
Court’s career offender designation. Bullock argues his 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 111 is not categorically a crime 
of violence.1 
 
 1 Relying on our precedent in United States v. Joseph, 
730 F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013), the Government argues 
Bullock failed to preserve this argument in the District Court. 
Id. at 342 (“[T]o preserve an argument and avoid waiver, the 
argument[s] presented in the Court of Appeals must depend on 
both the same legal rule and the same facts as the argument 
presented in the District Court.”). Bullock raised the argument, 
albeit briefly, in the objections he filed to the PSR. Crucially, 
Bullock also maintains the District Court discussed and ruled 
upon his argument during an unrecorded telephone conference 
improperly excluded from the record. See App. 105 
(referencing the “sentencing conference held on this matter”). 
At sentencing, Bullock’s counsel noted “Bullock [] simply 
wants to make sure that Your Honor is aware that the objection 
for the career offender is still outstanding from the defense.” 
App. 171–72. The Court responded it thought it had made a 
ruling on that and it was a matter Bullock could “certainly take 
up with the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 172. Taken together, the 
record indicates Bullock’s objections were discussed and ruled 
upon. So the argument was preserved. 
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II 
 Before he pleaded guilty in this case, Bullock had two 
prior convictions for robbery in North Carolina. The District 
Court found—and Bullock does not contest—that those 
convictions corresponded to generic robbery under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(a)(2). So Bullock is a career offender if his conviction 
in this case is a crime of violence. Section 111 states: 
(a) In general.--Whoever-- 
  (1) forcibly assaults, resists, 
opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with 
any person designated in section 1114 of this title 
while engaged in or on account of the 
performance of official duties . . . 
 shall, where the acts in violation of this 
section constitute only simple assault, be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than one 
year, or both, and where such acts involve 
physical contact with the victim of that assault or 
the intent to commit another felony, be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 
years, or both. 
(b) Enhanced penalty.--Whoever, in the 
commission of any acts described in subsection 
(a), uses a deadly or dangerous weapon 
(including a weapon intended to cause death or 
danger but that fails to do so by reason of a 
defective component) or inflicts bodily injury, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both. 
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18 U.S.C. § 111. 
 Since subsections (a) and (b) carry different 
punishments, subsection (b) constitutes a different offense. 
United States v. Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 630 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Accordingly, the Government argues that § 111 is divisible and 
the modified categorical approach applies. Bullock has not 
argued that § 111 is indivisible, Bullock Reply Br. 8., and does 
not mention the modified categorical approach in either of his 
briefs. But he acknowledges—consistent with our prior 
decision in United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 
2001)—that  “Section 111 sets forth three separate crimes for 
the use of varied forcible conduct.” Bullock Br. 9. In 
McCulligan, we held that “§§ 111(a) and 111(b) create three 
separate offenses: simple assaults, other ‘non-simple’ assaults 
not involving a dangerous weapon or injury, and assaults that 
involve a dangerous weapon or cause injury.” 256 F.3d at 102 
(citation omitted).2  
 Because § 111 creates three separate offenses, we join 
several of our sister circuits and hold that § 111 is divisible. See 
United States v. Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(“Thus, the statute is divisible, and the modified categorical 
approach applies.”); United States v. Kendall, 876 F.3d 1264, 
1269 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e conclude the statute is divisible 
as a whole.”); United States v. Taylor, 848 F.3d 476, 492 (1st 
Cir. 2017) (holding the statute “is plainly divisible”); United 
States v. Rafidi, 829 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding 
 
 
2 In McCulligan, we did not have occasion to consider 
whether assaultive conduct is always required under § 111 and 
we do not reach that issue today.  
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§ 111 “sets forth ‘three separate crimes’”) (citation omitted); 
United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 817 F.3d 207, 212 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (“But the parties agree, and our cases confirm, that 
§ 111 is divisible.”); see also United States v. Juvenile Female, 
566 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The appropriate question 
before us, therefore, is whether an ‘assault involving a deadly 
or dangerous weapon or resulting in bodily injury,’ under 18 
U.S.C. § 111, is, categorically, a crime of violence.” ). So we 
will apply the modified categorical approach. United States v. 
Ramos, 892 F.3d 599, 606–07 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 The modified categorical approach requires us to 
determine which subsection of § 111 Bullock violated. To do 
so, we inquire into the record of conviction “solely to 
determine the particular subpart under which the [defendant] 
was convicted.” Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 474 
n.16 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). The analysis then 
proceeds in the same manner as under the traditional 
categorical approach. 
 Guidelines § 4B1.1 provides that a defendant is a career 
offender if, among other factors, the “instant offense of 
conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Section 
4B1.2(a)(1) then defines a “crime of violence” as any offense 
punishable by more than one year in prison which “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 
This provision is known as the elements clause. See United 
States v. Wilson, 880 F.3d 80, 83 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 In determining whether a specific offense qualifies as a 
“crime of violence” under § 4B1.1, we “compare the elements 
of the statute under which the defendant was convicted to the 
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[G]uidelines’ definition of crime of violence.” Id. at 83 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When 
analyzing a statute under the elements clause, we must 
determine whether “the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against another person is categorically an 
element of the offense of conviction.” Ramos, 892 F.3d at 606 
(citation omitted). If it is, then the conviction is for a “crime of 
violence” under the Guidelines. Id. 
 Under the modified categorical approach, we look to the 
record of conviction to determine whether Bullock violated 
§ 111(a) or § 111(b). Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 
2256 (2016) (explaining the modified categorical approach 
permits courts to “review the record materials to discover 
which of the enumerated alternatives played a part in the 
defendant’s [] conviction”). Bullock pleaded guilty to a 
violation of “18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)&(b).” App. 7. The citation to 
both subsections indicates subsection (b) “was the operative 
statutory provision.” See Hernandez-Hernandez, 817 F.3d at 
214 & n.7. 
 Subsection (b) carries an enhanced penalty for offenders 
who use “a deadly or dangerous weapon” or who “inflict[] 
bodily injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). Six circuit courts have 
already held that subsection (b) is a crime of violence. See 
Bates, 960 F.3d at 1285; Kendall, 876 F.3d at 1269–70; Taylor, 
848 F.3d at 491–95; Rafidi, 829 F.3d at 445; Hernandez-
Hernandez, 817 F.3d at 217; Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d at 947–
48. Once again, we join the chorus. As the Tenth Circuit 
succinctly explained in Kendall, “a conviction under § 111(b) 
necessarily requires a finding the defendant intentionally used, 
attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force against the 
person of another.” 876 F.3d at 1270 (internal quotations marks 
and alterations omitted) (quoting Hernandez-Hernandez, 817 
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F.3d at 217). Here, Bullock pleaded guilty to the enhanced 
penalty under § 111(b).3  
  A defendant may violate § 111(b) by committing 
forcible assault and either (1) using a deadly or dangerous 
weapon, or (2) inflicting bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 111(b). In 
the first scenario, a deadly or dangerous weapon includes “any 
object which, as used or attempted to be used, may endanger 
the life of or inflict great bodily harm on a person.” United 
States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(collecting cases). “[T]he object’s latent capability . . . coupled 
with the manner of its use, is determinative.” United States v. 
Loman, 551 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). 
“A defendant who acts ‘forcibly’ using a deadly or dangerous 
weapon under § 111(b) must have used force by making 
physical contact with the federal employee, or at least 
threatened the employee, with an object that, as used, is 
capable of causing great bodily harm.” Taylor, 848 F.3d at 494. 
As the First Circuit aptly concluded, “this enhancement 
necessarily requires the use or threat of force ‘capable of 
 
 
3 Under both the unenhanced offense of § 111(a) and the 
enhanced offense of § 111(b), the government must prove the 
defendant acted “forcibly.” 18 U.S.C. § 111(a).  “The element 
of ‘forcible’ action can be met by a showing of either physical 
contact with the federal agent, or by ‘such a threat or display 
of physical aggression toward the officer as to inspire fear of 
pain, bodily harm, or death.’” Taylor, 848 F.3d at 493 (quoting 
Rafidi, 829 F.3d at 446). We need not decide here whether 
either offense under § 111(a) qualifies as a crime of violence, 
because Bullock pleaded guilty to the enhanced penalty under 
§ 111(b). 
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causing physical pain or injury to another.’” Id. (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). 
 In the second scenario, “[a]n assault that causes bodily 
injury by definition involves the use of physical force.” 
Kendall, 876 F.3d at 1270. The Supreme Court has defined 
physical force as “violent force—that is, force capable of 
causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson, 
559 U.S. at 140. A forcible assault causing bodily injury is a 
“crime of violence” because it requires the use of physical 
force. See Bates, 960 F.3d at 1287; Taylor, 848 F.3d at 494 (“If 
a slap in the face counts as violent force under Johnson because 
it is capable of causing pain or injury, a forcible act that injures 
does, too, because the defendant necessarily must have 
committed an act of force in causing the injury[.]”) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted). The bottom line is that 
a defendant who violates § 111(b) has used physical force 
against the person of another, either through employing a 
deadly or dangerous weapon or by inflicting bodily injury.   
III 
 Relying on an Eighth Circuit case, United States v. 
Murdock, 826 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1987), Bullock argues that 
§ 111 is not a crime of violence because one can violate the 
statute by indirectly causing bodily injury (i.e., without 
physical force as defined by the Supreme Court in Johnson, 
559 U.S. at 140), or by using a deadly or dangerous weapon to 
interfere with an official, but without deploying or threatening 
to deploy that weapon against the person of that officer. 
 In Murdock, a dispute over whether the defendant’s 
cattle were allowed to graze on public land turned ugly. After 
Murdock and a park ranger argued, Murdock “drove up on his 
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motorcycle, got into the [park ranger’s] jeep, and drove it away 
from the gate.” Id. at 772. When the ranger ran back to the jeep 
and “leaned in through the open window to try to pull the keys 
out of the ignition[,] Murdock resisted her and tried to roll up 
the window in the passenger door.” Id. He then “turned the 
engine off, opened the hood, and pulled the distributor wire off 
the distributor to disable the vehicle.” Id. Bullock interprets 
this case to mean that the “forcible conduct” required by the 
plain language of § 111 need not be directed “against the 
person of another” as required by Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 and 
4B1.2(a)(1).  
 Murdock is distinguishable from Bullock’s case. First 
and most critically, at the time of Murdock’s conviction, § 111 
did not contain separate subsections as it does now. Though it 
did contain an unnamed enhanced penalty for use of a deadly 
or dangerous weapon, there is no indication Murdock received 
that enhanced penalty. In fact, Murdock received only a one-
year suspended jail term and two years of probation. Murdock, 
826 F.2d at 772. So Murdock sheds no light on the current 
version of § 111, which we (and six of our sister courts) have 
held to be divisible.  
 We likewise disagree with Bullock’s broader argument, 
supposedly illustrated by the facts in Murdock, that “[n]either 
bodily injury nor use of a deadly weapon under § 111(b) need 
have resulted from force used against the person.” Bullock Br. 
12. The defendant’s forcible conduct must take the form of 
either contact with the officer or else “such a threat or display 
of physical aggression toward the officer as to inspire fear of 
pain, bodily harm, or death.” Taylor, 848 F.3d at 493 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Contrary to Bullock’s assertion, the 
force contemplated by the statute, in other words, must be 
directed at the officer and the plain text of the statute makes 
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clear that the bodily injury must be “inflict[ed]” by the 
defendant “in the commission of” the acts set forth in § 111(a).  
This is only bolstered by the Supreme Court’s and our Court’s 
rejection of Bullock’s attempted distinction between direct and 
indirect force that results in bodily injury. United States v. 
Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 170 (2014) (“And the common-law 
concept of ‘force’ encompasses even its indirect 
application . . . . It is impossible to cause bodily injury without 
applying force in the common-law sense.”); United States v. 
Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 132–33 (3d Cir. 2017) (“It is 
important to note that the use of physical force does not require 
that the person employing force directly apply harm to—i.e., 
strike—the victim.”) (emphasis in original); accord Rafidi, 829 
F.3d at 446 (“[E]ven if the defendant [does] not come into 
physical contact with the officers at all, the government still 
must establish the ‘forcible’ element [required by § 111].”). 
And it applies with equal force to the enhancement for a deadly 
or dangerous weapon.  The use of such a weapon “in the 
commission of” an act that includes either the deployment of 
force against an officer or the threat of force is plainly a crime 
of violence.    
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we hold 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) is 
categorically a crime of violence under the Sentencing 
Guidelines. And because Bullock was properly designated a 
career offender, we will affirm his judgment of sentence.  
